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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent contributions on open and voluntary information disclosure have delivered
some insight into why ﬁrms may be interested in freely revealing technological knowl-
edge to other ﬁrms and to technology users.1 So far, this newly shaping literature
has already characterized a variety of channels by which ﬁrms disclose information.
While future empirical studies will reveal whether patents are substitutes or com-
plements to other means of open knowledge disclosure, this topic is becoming of
interest for theoretical research. In this paper, we follow Muller and Penin’s (2004)
broader idea that ﬁrms may want to disclose their knowledge through patent ap-
plications. We examine the incentives why and under which conditions ﬁrms signal
their competencies to ﬁrms located in a foreign country, and under which conditions
they don’t. In a broader perspective, our paper connects back to the early patent-
ing literature that highlights the informational role of patents together with patent
scope. It also relates to some arguments on disclosure and enablement, in particular
to the often-stated and insuﬃcently illuminated fact that the patent system itself
is a mechanism by which ﬁrms through patenting signal information to other ﬁrms
and technology users (Wright 1983, Merges and Nelson 1990).2
After the 1998 surge in patenting in North America that can, by and large, ex-
plained by the reforms of the relative patent systems (Cohen et al., 2002, Gallini
2002, Kortum and Lerner 1999), it is worth to connect to arguments in the current
policy debate on re-designing patent systems.3 A well-known argument has been
that small innovative ﬁrms do not ﬁle patent applications with a comparable fre-
quency as large ﬁrms do, because the procedure is far too costly. In particular, the
high costs of international ﬁling procedures at the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO)
have been a major concern for policymakers.4 While an institutional reform is still
pending, policymakers have tried to mitigate some disadvantages outlined above by
oﬀering subsidies that cover patent application fees, patent attorney services, and
related expenses in order to encourage small ﬁrms to increase their patent portfolio
beyond their home country. Current policy debates in the EU underline the priority
given to the redesign of the patent system, strongly emphasizing its informational
role.5
In this paper we argue that patent applications in large regions (Europe, U.S.)
may become a signaling device for ﬁrms in speciﬁc regions and small countries to
signal the quality to potential foreign R&D partners.
We oﬀer a theoretical treatment of patent subsidies for a particular setting in
which two ﬁrms, located in the same country, have already gained patent protection
by a nationwide granted patent. Both ﬁrms need to decide whether to apply for a
patent abroad. Whether it can be of any value to oﬀer patent subsidies depends
1See e.g. Harhoﬀ et al. (2003).
2For an overview, see Langinier and Moschini (2002).
3For an overview, see e.g. ECSC-EC-EAEC (2000).
4For a description see Grupp and Schmoch (1999, FN4).
5EU policymakers have not only set this topic on the European Union’s “Lisbon Agenda,” but
currently conducts a series of hearings for patent users, pointing out that the “European patent
system is seen by many as a model for successful international co-operation in the ﬁeld of patents.”
(EPO 2004).
2on the existence of private information, in particular regarding the relative quality
of the innovation under consideration. We argue that a theoretical underpinning of
the incentives to disclose through patenting is necessary, for the following reasons.
Empirical observations suggest that small ﬁrms are either not able or not willing
to signal their competences via other channels, or that they at least have been un-
able to do so in the past. Whether a speciﬁc channel to disclose information can be
the right means to use depends on how the disclosing ﬁrms may rely on this channel.
Some channels of open knowledge disclosure may be regarded by receivers as lacking
quality and reputation. One may doubt if a worldwide operating ﬁrm collects infor-
mation from less renowned sources than from patent oﬃces, both concerning patent
applications and patented innovations. Moreover, patent information provided by
EU member states is by nature less accessible than an EU-wide information source,
not only because of language barriers. In particular, we argue that information con-
nected to the patenting process is being seen of a certain quality by outside ﬁrms
and technology users.
Moreover, information on internationally patented inventions is becoming in-
creasingly available. The EPO’s Open Patent Services initiative (EPO 2003) as
a means to improve access to patent information furthermore backs our argument
on distinguishing national from international patent data. Our paper takes this
fact into account by treating patent applications as a signal of quality for speciﬁc
technological competencies.
We argue that ﬁrms that already developed diﬀerent technologies for a speciﬁc
application may, although holding a patent in their home country, be reluctant to
patent their result internationally, not because of facing potential infringement suits
and of diminished chances of being granted an international patent, but because
these technologies may, in other countries and for other users, not be seen as easily
implementable, and this for a variety of reasons, such as technical or legal standards,
norms, and the relative degree of ﬁtness into other technology designs. This view
is related to the the concept of “tacit competencies.” Technological competencies
are context-speciﬁcb yn a t u r es i n c et h e yr e ﬂect the result of research conducted
by ﬁrms in their speciﬁc R&D network. Technological competencies therefore are
the “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place”.6 To translate
these competencies into other settings is diﬃcult, costly, and sometimes impossible.
The following questions spring to mind: What happens in the speciﬁcs i t u a t i o n
of a research network that ceases existing? How are ﬁrms limited by the tacitness
of their knowledge when they on a sudden face a diﬀerent environment? Can they
immediately connect to new R&D partners? If they might want to, would they
disclose through directly accessing new R&D partners or even freely disclose their
knowledge to everybody? Should they refrain from directly accessing new networks
because of quality issues, are their old competencies completely lost or are ﬁrms
able and willing to adapt their R&D results to the need of other users? If so,
what are the requirements to signal quality? In short: what are the incentives to
signal competencies to outside actors, given the particular setting in which the
ﬁrms operate, and given that ﬁrms, others than policymakers hold an informational
6Hayek (1945:521).
3advantage over the quality?
Our starting point is that it is far from obvious that ﬁrms will patent any in-
vention and innovation. This is known since Mansﬁeld’s (1986) empirical study and
has been underpinned theoretically already in Horstmann et al. (1985). To analyze
why ﬁrms may or may not disclose, we propose a signaling model with two domestic
ﬁrms, both owning an invention that is already patented in their home country.
This follows the motive of ﬁrms to appropriate the returns of their innovation where
their markets are. We furthermore assume that because of language or institutional
barriers, foreign technology users are not aware of the speciﬁc quality of an only
domestically patented invention. Quality, in this view, is receiver-dependent in that
it reﬂects the needs and the technology orientation of the foreign ﬁrm, which itself
may be only incompletely known by the domestic ﬁrms. The key issue in our model
is not a potential patent race in a ﬁrst-to-ﬁle world. We instead suggest a viewpoint
according to which a domestic ﬁrm with technological competencies that are closer
to meet the speciﬁc quality preferences of a foreign ﬁrm is more likely to disclose,
following its relatively lower variable costs of development.
We hence exclude a situation in which a domestic ﬁrm applies for international
patent protection with exactly the same invention that has already been granted
a domestic patent. Both ﬁrms decide on whether to engage in costly incremental
development to translate their invention into an international patent application.
Whether they actually decide to disclose or not, depends on the expected proﬁts
of disclosure, but it also depends on their chances to gain such a proﬁt, given the
presence of a second domestic ﬁrm that may hold similar competencies.
Our paper may be of some interest from a game-theoretic perspective since it
diﬀers from standard monopoly signaling models. We use a real three-player game
with two ﬁrms that send a signal; not only one sender that can be of diﬀerent
types.7 Since the receiver always decides upon picking one ﬁrm only, this leads to
a particular treatment of equilibria. To come full circle, our paper can be seen as
complementary to the work of Anton and Yao (2004)). It diﬀers from their main
o b j e c t i v es i n c ew ed on o ta c c o u n tf o rt h ei m p a c to ft y p e - d e p e n d e n tc o s t se ﬀects on
innovation size, imitation, market structure, and disclosure. Instead, we focus on
the level of disclosure to receivers residing in a diﬀerent country. The receiver, in
our model, does not proﬁt from actual disclosures being made, but uses the level of
disclosure only to infer about the ﬁrms’ types.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section two highlights some empirical facts
and sets the stage for the model. Section three provides the theoretical analysis.
Section four discusses the impact of patent subsidies, section ﬁve concludes.
7To our knowledge, the only ﬁe l di nw h i c ho l i g o p o l ym o d e l sw i t ht w os e n d e r sa n do n er e c e i v e r
are commonly applied to is the literature on price competition and advertising (Hertzendorf and
Overgaard 2000, and 2001). The setup of our model diﬀers however largely from theirs; and we reach
diﬀerent conclusions as to the existence of pooling equilibria and the applicability of reﬁnements.
42 An empirical motivation8
While our paper oﬀers a comprehensive treatment of cases, it is expedient to high-
light that it traces back to the analysis of a very particular case of transition, namely
the situation of East-German after the Germany’s re-uniﬁcation. This abrupt change
has led both ﬁrms and policymakers into a situation in which standard explanations
became obsolete and policy approaches lost their grip. Because of the unique change
in history, policymakers have applied a large variety of instruments, including patent
subsidies, designed to mitigate the costs of patent applications.
A few empirical facts illustrating the situation are worth being pointed out.
· R&D activity. The ﬁrst years after 1990, East-German ﬁrms faced an overhang
of research personnel. Following R&D input indicators in the manufacturing sector,
R&D personnel relative to total employees has decreased until 1993. The situation
has reversed since then, supported by public funding.
· Regional concentration of R&D. The two most innovative sub-regions of East
Germany, Saxony and Thuringia, show a relative R&D personnel of 3.84% and
3.64%, respectively, compared to the total number of employees (manufacturing
sector)in 1995. These values are close to the average sub-region in Germany and
have been relatively stable since (Gick 1998). In 2001, East-German ﬁrms count for
8% of all ﬁrm-employed R&D personnel in the country (DIW 2003).
· Domestic patent productivity. This indicator showed a slightly encouraging
picture. East Germany counted for 5-6 percent of all German patent applications
from 1995-7 (1995: 5.51%, 1996: 5.57%, 1997: 5.78%, with values for Saxony of
2.3%, 2.18%, and 2.17% in this period, for Thuringia 1.27%, 1.32%, and 1.36%,
followed by the town region of East Berlin of 1.22 and less, respectively).9 This, in
its sum, describes ﬁrms in this region to show a rather stable and slightly upward
development since 1991. The percentage of product innovations compared to the
total number is currently not lower than in West Germany (DIW 2003: 748); ﬁrms
are prevalently pursuing R&D in local research networks, and the percentage of
patents stemming from outside the business sector has decreased since 199310
· International patent applications. The picture of a relatively weak but stable
innovative behavior in this sub-region is disturbed by one particular indicator: the
percentage of patent applications ﬁled by ﬁrms in East Germany in more than one
country. This ﬁgure has remained particularly low, compared to the rate that West-
German ﬁrms showed during the same period (see ﬁg. 1). While the rate itself shows
an increase over time, the still low level of this activity throughout the documented
8Much of the spirit of this paper traces back to my activities as a Senior Researcher at the IFO
Institute in Germany during the years 1998 and 1999. I thank Konrad Faust for having pointed
me toward this interesting problem and having encouraged me to add to it.
9See Gick (1998).
10See Greif (1998). While the direction of innovative activity indeed shows an upward trend, its
level in terms of patent productivity is still low, compared to West German sub-regions. Northrhine-
Westphalia and Bavaria have reached a patent per R&D employee ratio of 0.19 and 0.13 during
this time, while Saxony positioned itself in the upper mid-ﬁeld within Germany with a level of 0.09.
The majority of innovations were achieved in mid-technology ﬁelds of the manufacturing sector.
Discouragingly, only 5% of East German start-ups belong to technology-intensive sectors (DIW
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Figure 1: Percentage of patent applications in at least two countries compared to national
patent applications in West and East Germany. Source: Gick (1998), data based on IFO
patent statistics that has been closed since. The values for 1996 are incomplete (without
U.S. data).
period remains a puzzle.11
This all suggests that ﬁrms in East Germany may have had particular reasons to
not apply for international patent protection, since they clearly increased the num-
bers of domestic patent applications, and far-reaching subsidies were available.12
Explanations that were given by researchers included the local and regional orien-
tation of East German ﬁrms, which makes domestic patent protection the primary
goal. Together with the fact that the high-tech sector is less pronounced in this
region, it was commonly argued that ﬁrms in this regions were simply “not ready”
to encompass international activities. Policymakers understood the latter strategy
as being a next step, to be undertaken after a ﬁrst phase of domestic consolidation
would have been taken place.
We argue that this argument, as it stands, does not hold water. It lacks a
sound explanation why and when ﬁrms do not patent internationally even if they
could. What makes these ﬁrms choose to not undertake international activities?
The fact that even today the situation has not improved suggests the need for a dif-
ferent explanation. Our view is in line with Kabla’s (1995) general observation that
propensity to patent depends on the patenting behavior of other ﬁrms operating in
the same branch. Relatedly, Harabi (1995) has shown that small ﬁrms patent in
order to protect their position against imitation, but also “as a means of entry into
11As a rule of thumb, ﬁrms in the most industrialized countries of Western Europe patent roughly
40% of their national patents abroad as well. This ﬁgure of course diﬀers across industries.
12Since the beginning of the 1990s, a German national program (Patentf¨ orderung Ost) oﬀered
coverage of ﬁling and application costs, including the costs for the patent attorney.
6foreign markets (directly through direct investment and production or indirectly
through granting a licensing agreement).”13 In particular, Faust (1990) has argued
that patent applications in foreign countries may be determined by proﬁt expecta-
tions that a ﬁrm under consideration may hold. Only if the commercial value would
compensate for the higher costs, a ﬁrm may want take international patenting into
consideration.
Our paper follows this argument closely. It is both in line with Faust’s (1990)
view of international patents being a stake for future R&D partnerships, and with
Hicks (1995) argument that ﬁrms signal tacit competencies through disclosing in-
formation, indicating the presence of additional knowledge. To illustrate, consider
a product innovation, invented and implemented in an East German or Eastern
European R&D network before 1990. With the end of the Soviet bloc, these net-
works dissolved, but as long as the innovation had a chance to be granted national
patent protection in Germany after 1990, it was worth for the ﬁrm to apply for it.
Will the ﬁrm now immediately patent this invention abroad? Leaving aside patent
infringement considerations in our analysis14, we need to examine the incentives to
patent in a foreign country.
Example 1 Assume that a domestic ﬁrm, labeled ﬁrm D1, holds a national patent
on a high-tech carburator designed for a speciﬁc combustible engine.15 What makes
this ﬁrm presume that this patent will ﬁnd enough attention of a foreign ﬁrm or
of a foreign R&D network? The invention needs to be of a speciﬁc quality in its
particular ﬁeld. In our example, if the carburator cannot be of use for an engine
that is to be produced by the foreign ﬁrm, or if the adaptation costs are excessively
high, it will not help the domestic ﬁrm to enter an international R&D cooperation,
despite the possible value of the invention as a masterpiece of engineering.
Keeping the example, let us not extend the setting to include another domestic
ﬁrm D2. Would the foreign ﬁrm still be interested in an adaptation of the carburator
technology when ﬁrm D2 oﬀers a better technological solution for the foreign ﬁrm,
say in form of an already (nationally) patented injection pump?16 Firm D1, if the
East-German ﬁrm, may face high costs of turning the already (nationally) patented
carburator into a new design, adaptable to foreign standards, while ﬁrm D2 may
face less costs to do so. Firm D1 in such a setting will rather refrain from patenting
internationally, since the competitor’s chances are anyway higher to be picked as
an R&D partner by the foreign ﬁrm if it can utilize the same channel of disclosure.
Firm D1, knowing that its technology may be improvable by incremental development
to be a good ﬁt, needs to level up with an R&D standard that is set by its (domestic)
competitor.17
13Harabi (1995:990).
14This makes sense for a broad range of cases in which the East German ﬁrm used a technology
b a s e do nad i ﬀerent research ﬁeld, compared to the technology used in Western countries.
15Given the rather high quality standards required by the German patent oﬃce, we may assume
that an innovation, when granted a national patent, has a high chance to reach international patent
protection as well (I owe this thought to Mark Schankerman).
16We assume in Section 3 that national patenting is solely undertaken to ensure the intellectual
property rights in the domestic market and cannot convey information to outside ﬁrms.
17Note again that ”quality” as deﬁned here does not necessarily mean that the East-German ﬁrm’s
7Conversely, assume now that ﬁrm D1, has a cost advantage in that its develop-
ment costs are lower that those of D2. As long it can assume that its technology
includes speciﬁc properties that the foreign ﬁrm is looking for, it may decide to
patent this innovation internationally, despite the presence of domestically known
comparable R&D results.
This example motivates some thoughts that led to our model presented in the
following section. As a caveat that applies to any stylized example, one should keep
in mind that we do not necessarily argue that the foreign ﬁrm will hold priors that
favor ﬁrm D2. Whether the priors are diﬀuse or inclined towared one of the ﬁrms,
depends entirely on the situation under consideration.
Furthermore, we argue that a speciﬁc regional identity of the ﬁrms has no in-
ﬂuence. We exclude e.g. the address of a ﬁrm to be a signal by which the foreign
technology may infer the quality of the ﬁrm. Other than via patenting disclosure,
D1 or D2 have no chance to ﬁnd and to contact a potential foreign R&D partner.
3 The model
3.1 Basic setup
To capture the situation sketched above, consider a three-player signaling game with
two senders and one receiver. There are two domestic ﬁrms that hold either high
or low competencies in a speciﬁc ﬁeld of application. A foreign ﬁrm, F, does not
know which of the domestic ﬁrms is of high and which of low competencies, when
randomly picking one as cooperation partner. To illustrate, we label the two ﬁrms i
and j.T h et w oﬁrms may signal their competencies through disclosure. Disclosure is
described by the variable δ ∈ [0,1], which we normalize to 1 in the case of disclosing
the highest possible quality. Last we assume that a domestic ﬁrm by choosing a
disclosure level δ = 0 does not incur any costs of incremental development, nor of
the (ﬁxed) costs through patent applications. Contingent on the observation of a
disclosure pair (δ1,δ2), ﬁrm F updates beliefs and chooses a ﬁrm with which to form
ap a r t n e r s h i p .
Let γ(δi,δj) ∈ {i,j,0} denote F’s choice of partner, where γ(δi,δj)=0i m p l i e s
that F does not form an R&D partnership with either ﬁrm. Then, we may deﬁne
ﬁrm i’s revenue function as a function of F’s choice as follows:
Ri (γ(δi,δj)) =
(
0i fγ(δi,δj) ∈ {j,0}
R > 0i fγ(δi,δj)=i .
Firm i’s cost function Ci(δi)=C
p
f +ci(δi)c o v e rt h eﬁxed patenting costs (patent
fee etc.) CP
f ,a n dv a r i a b l ec o s t sci(δi)of incremental development, depending on the
domestic ﬁrm’s type. These variable costs can be linear or convex, which is speciﬁed
in a later subsection.
invention has a lower value from a scientiﬁc perspective, but from the foreign ﬁrm F
0s perspective
as technology user it is less applicable.
8Figure 2: The domestic ﬁrms’ total costs of disclosure as a function of their type.
To reach a speciﬁc quality level of disclosure, δi, ﬁrm i invests in development,
innovates by spending the type-dependent variable development costs ci(δi), plus
pays the ﬁxed patenting costs C
p
f. h e r e .F o rs i m p l i c i t y ,w el a b e lt h et y p ed e p e n d e n t
variable costs cL and cH, which permits us to illustrate the cost function Ci(δi)=
C
p
f + ci(δi) as follows (see fig. 2).
We are now able to deﬁne ﬁrm i’s proﬁts as functions of (δi,δj)a n dF’s decision
rule, γ :
Πi(δi,δj;γ)=Ri(γ(δ1,δ2) − Ci(δi).
Let now µi(δi,δj)b eﬁrm F’s assessment that ﬁrm i, when disclosing δi, holds
competencies belonging to type i. The quality of the knowledge stock of ﬁrms i and
j are perfectly negatively correlated, with µi(δi,δj)=1− µj(δj,δi). This permits
us to simplify the setting by using the following notation that we keep for the rest
of the paper: Nature ﬂips a coin and creates the following two exclusive events:
• Event HL: Firm 1 is of type H , ﬁrm 2 of type L
• Event LH: Firm 2 is of type H , ﬁrm 1 of type L.
F holds prior beliefs such that event HLoccurs with probability ν, and consequently
that event LH occurs with probability 1 − ν. This assumption comes without loss
of generality.
9To illustrate, F when choosing ﬁrm 1 picks type H with probability ν. In the
trivial case of diﬀuse priors with ν = .5,F picks ﬁrm 1 randomly, but only if its
proﬁt expectations permit so: although diﬀering in their competencies, the type of
ﬁrms H and L is not known to F. The only information source ﬁrm F has about the
quality of ﬁrm H stems from disclosure through international patenting. Unless we
deviate from the assumption of diﬀuse priors in Case 2b, we require that µ(δ,δ)=1
2.
We furthermore assume that F does not produce for the domestic market of the
two competitors, nor does it attempt to enter the domestic market after an R&D
cooperation with one of the domestic ﬁrms. Similarly, none of the domestic ﬁrms
is envisaging international patenting in order to reach a stake in the foreign market
that permits either of them to compete with F in the latter’s country, but to reach
higher proﬁts resulting from a research partnership with the foreign ﬁrm.
We deﬁne the payoﬀ ranking of ﬁrm F. Whenever denoting F’s proﬁts, the super-





Firm F’s proﬁts itself do not depend on the level of disclosure of either domestic
ﬁrm but on the type of the ﬁrm with which it is cooperating. To motivate why
the foreign ﬁrm is strictly worse oﬀ when cooperating with L we assume that the
cost of cooperating with L are higher because of its lower competencies, leading to a
negative net value of cooperating with ﬁrm L. Under full information, F picks ﬁrm H
as cooperation partner. If F is not informed about the state of nature, asymmetric
information aﬀects the result. Thus, by disclosing information, the domestic ﬁrm(s)
mitigate the problem of asymmetric information.
3.2 Timing
The timing of the game reads as follows:
Nature deter- L and H decide One/both domestic F observes the Out-
mines the on investing ﬁrms develop and signal and picks come
competencies in incremental disclose through either L or H and
of L and H development patenting abroad as R&D partner payoﬀs.
––×–––––––×––––––×–––––––×–––––×–>
A few explanations are in order. For simplicity and without loss of generality we
exclude decisions on domestic patenting but assume that at t =0e a c hd o m e s t i c
ﬁrm already holds a national patent that protects its intellectual property rights in
the home country. Incremental development reaches a possible quality increase for
F, compared to the existing patent, but the disclosed innovation through patenting
is never a completely ﬁnished solution that can already be licensed to F,i ti sr a t h e r
that F needs to win the better domestic ﬁrm for joint R&D. Although our model is
compatible with licensing, we do not further refer to this issue in our exposition.
103.3 Equilibria
We now determine F’s ex-ante payoﬀ νΠH
F +(1−ν)ΠL
F from cooperating with ﬁrm
1 and compare this expected value with the payoﬀ under noncooperation ΠN
F , which
leads us to two general cases that determine the behavior of ﬁrm F, given that F
holds priors that HL occurs, with ν ≥ .5 . There are two relevant payoﬀ cases:
• Payoﬀ Situation 1: The payoﬀ when not cooperating exceeds the expected
payoﬀ of cooperation: νΠH
F +(1−ν)ΠL
F < ΠN
F . In the case is case, F will choose to
not cooperate with either ﬁrm.




F . Cooperation is much more likely in this situation:
Under diﬀuse priors, ﬁrm F randomizes, under priors of ν>. 5i tp i c k sﬁrm 1 as its
cooperation partner if no additional information is available.
Deﬁnition 2 AP e r f e c tB a yesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a strategy proﬁle (ˆ δH,ˆ δL)
together with a system of beliefs µ such that
(i) ˆ δH =a r g m a x
δH
ΠH(δH,ˆ δL;γ),
(ii) ˆ δL =a r g m a x
δL
ΠL(δL,ˆ δH;γ),
and a system of beliefs such that consistency with strategies is fulﬁlled:
(iii) µi(ˆ δL,ˆ δH)=0and µj(ˆ δH,ˆ δL)=1if ˆ δL 6= ˆ δH (consistency),
(iv) µ1(δ,δ)=ν for all δ (consistency).
F’s equilibrium strategy is
(v) ˆ γ(δi,δj)=i if µi(δi,δj)=1and ˆ γ(δ1,δ2)=0if µ1(δ1,δ2)=ν (Payoﬀ Situation
1),
(vi) ˆ γ(δ1,δ2)=1if µ1(δ1,δ2)=ν (Payoﬀ Situation 2).
We now use the foreign ﬁrms beliefs at out-of-equilibrium disclosures to check which
diﬀerent kinds of equilibria are supported by the out-of equilibrium beliefs.
First, consider a situation in which F maintains its prior beliefs independent of
the ﬁrms disclosures. Then, an equilibrium exists in which neither ﬁrm discloses,
since disclosure is costly and cannot inﬂuence F’s decision. This equilibrium is
trivial. It exists because of ﬁrm F’s refusal to update. We therefore rule out these
beliefs. We will maintain the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs throughout the
remainder of the paper.
11Deﬁnition 3 Out-of-equilibrium Beliefs:
For any out-of-equilibrium disclosure pair (δi,δj):
(i) if max(δi,δj) < ˆ δH,t h e nµ1(δ1,δ2)=ν,
(ii) if max(δi,δj) ≥ ˆ δH,t h e nµi(δi,δj)=
(
1 if δi >δ j,
0 if δi <δ j, and µ1(δ,δ)=ν.
If both ﬁrms disclose less than ˆ δH,Fretains its prior beliefs, while if at least one
ﬁrm discloses at least the level ˆ δH,Fbelieves that the ﬁrm disclosing the most is of
type H. This is intuitive since the H-type ﬁrm has a lower cost of disclosure for all
levels of disclosure. In the same setting, whenever the domestic ﬁrms disclose the
same amount, the prior is maintained.
Under these out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the two domestic ﬁrms may aﬀect F’s
decision, provided they disclose a suﬃcient amount. The overall picture oﬀers the
consistent view that F punishes low disclosures whenever believing the ﬁrm under
consideration is of type L. However, since F cannot believe that both are of type L,
it resorts to its prior belief in this case.
This now permits us to examine the conditions for equilibrium outcomes in the
following cases:
3.3.1 Case 1: νΠH
F +( 1− ν)ΠL
F < ΠN
F and ν ≥ .5 18
This case represents the ﬁrst of two intuitive cases. It refers to the situation in
which the foreign ﬁrm is not completely uninformed and may holds prior beliefs in
favor of ﬁrm 1.
This case best motivates why signaling is needed according to F’s payoﬀ con-
dition νΠH
F +( 1− ν)ΠL
F < ΠN
F together with the condition for the priors ν ≥ .5
without loss of generality. Here, F needs a separating signal to tell the two ﬁrms
apart. Otherwise, the belief structure will render cooperation impossible.
Existence. We now analyze under which conditions the domestic ﬁrms are willing
to send these signals. Whenever speaking of the domestic ﬁrms’ payoﬀs, we use the
notation (δH,δL), in this sequence. The superscript used for the domestic ﬁrms’
payoﬀ denotes the putative mode of cooperation, with C denoting cooperation be-
tween F and the ﬁrm under consideration, O indicating cooperation between F and
the domestic competitor, and N, as before, non-cooperation. Given that ﬁrm F




and two for ﬁrm L :
ΠO
L(δ∗,0) ≥ ΠN
L (δ∗,δ∗). (IC LN)
18For other priors, the foreign ﬁrm switches from case HL to LH because of symmetry.
12ΠO
L(δ∗,0) ≥ ΠC
L(δ∗,δ∗ + ε), (IC LC)
for any ε>0.
Solution. (i) (IC H). Without loss of generality we may set ΠN
H(0,0) = 0. This
reduces the observation to ΠC
H(δ∗,0) ≥ 0. Since ΠC
H(δ∗,0) = R − (CP
f + cH(δ∗)),
we may state that (IC H) holds if and only if R ≥ CP
f + cH(δ∗), in words, if H’s
expected cooperation beneﬁts R at least cover its patenting plus development costs.
(ii) (IC LN). As long as L cannot beneﬁtf r o ma ni n c r e a s ei ni t sr i v a l ’ sc o s to fd i s -
closure, we can assume that ΠO
L(δ∗,0) is zero. The R.H.S. however is negative since
ΠN
L (δ∗,δ∗) entails signaling costs of CP
f +cL(δ∗). Under reasonable assumptions, (IC
LN)i sa l w a y sf u l ﬁlled.
(iii) (IC LC). For the same reason as in (ii), let us set ΠO
L(δ∗,0) = 0. (IC LC)h o l d s
if and only if R ≤ (CP
f + cL(δ∗ + ε)). Since lim
ε→0
(cL(δ∗ + ε)) = cL(δ∗),the L-type
ﬁrm wouldn’t ﬁnd it proﬁtable to overshoot δ∗ even if, by doing so, it could ensure
F’s cooperation.
Proposition 4 Under the given assumptions on belief structure and payoﬀ condi-
tions, the game has a continuum of separating PBE, in which H discloses exactly
the disclosure level δ∗, and L discloses 0, with δ∗ satisfying CP
f + cH(δ∗) ≤ R ≤
CP
f + cL(δ∗).
Note that the set of δ∗deﬁned according to this proposition is non-empty because
cH(δ∗) <c L(δ∗) for all δ>0.
Equilibrium Reﬁnements.19 The continuum of separating PBE however occurs
as long as ﬁrm F does not update its beliefs for the necessary minimum level of δ∗.
Suppose there is an equilibrium in which ﬁrm F would hold the new unreasonable
belief structure:




1i fδ1 = δ∗ + α and δ2 6= δ∗ + α
ν if δ1 = δ2
0 otherwise.
Under this belief structure, any signal less than δ∗ + α will be interpreted by ﬁrm
F as stemming from L. Firm H would be willing to disclose within the interval
[δ∗,δ∗ + α], while ﬁrm L would not. In other words, to signal within this interval
would constitute an equilibrium-dominated strategy for L. This can be checked as
follows:
19This equilibrium-domination based reﬁnement concept follows the exposition of the more gen-
eral case described in Mas-Colell et al. (1995:471).
13Assume ﬁrst that by sending such a signal, ﬁrm L makes F b e l i e v et h a ti ti so ft y p e
L, then it would not have been necessary at all to send this signal, since a lower
disclosure would have led to the same result at lower costs.
Second, if ﬁrm L by sending such a signal would make F believe that its type
is H, then this disclosure would be at too high a level. L would need to behave
optimally after, and would not want to mimic H. Thus, any signal in the interval
[δ∗,δ∗ + α] would be equilibrium dominated for ﬁrm L.
Note that in none of the two cases ﬁrm F w o u l da s s i g na n yp o s i t i v ep r o b a b i l i t y
to a signal observed in the interval [δ∗,δ∗ + α] stemming from ﬁrm L if F has a
reasonable belief structure. Therefore the separating PBE described in case 1 cannot
be a sensible prediction as long as ﬁrm F maintains the new belief structure. Since
we need to limit our observations to equilibrium responses and to reasonable beliefs
should our separating PBE be a sensible prediction, we can drop the assumption
that ﬁrm F will maintain any belief structure of this kind.
We therefore have narrowed down our case to a unique separating PBE that
involves the lowest amount of disclosure for the type-H ﬁrm that is consistent with
(IC LC): that is, δ∗deﬁned by R = CP
f + cL(δ∗).
Nonexistence of Pooling Equilibria.
Proposition 5 No pooling equilibria can exist given our maintained belief structure.
Proof. First, consider a candidate for a pooling equilibrium involving δ ≥ δ∗.
Both ﬁrms are incurring costs of disclosure but neither receives a contract with F.
Thus, either ﬁrm would do strictly better by defecting to no disclosure.
Next, consider a candidate for a pooling equilibrium involving δ ≤ δ∗, including
δ =0 . Similarly, neither ﬁrm is receiving a contract, but ﬁrm H would do strictly
better by defecting to δ∗ and reaching cooperation with F.
3.3.2 Case 2: νΠH
F +( 1− ν)ΠL
F ≥ ΠN
F
Case 2a: ν = .5
• Separating equilibria.
Whenever observing δ1 = δ2, ﬁrm F is indiﬀerent between choosing ﬁrm 1 or 2 as
its cooperation partner. Since ﬁrm F ’s payoﬀ does not depend on δ, there is no
rational reason why ﬁrm F should not cooperate with either ﬁrm after observing
δ1 = δ2, even if this would be below some threshold value δ that can be reached by
L. This threshold value can be close to zero.
F in this case sets its priors and thus chooses ﬁrm 1 with probability .5a si t s
partner when observing δ1 = δ2. Any positive probability of choosing ﬁrm 1 is
a credible threat for ﬁrm 2 and vice versa, punishing the domestic ﬁrms’ out-of
equilibrium actions.
The conditions for which (δ∗,0) forms a separating PBE are now reading
ΠC
H(δ∗,0) ≥ .5 · ΠC
H(0,0) + .5 · ΠO
H(0,0), (IC H’)
14ΠO
L(δ∗,0) ≥ .5 · ΠO
L(δ∗,δ∗)+.5 · ΠN
L (δ∗,δ∗), (IC LN ’)
ΠO
L(δ∗,0) ≥ ΠC
L(δ∗,δ∗ + ε). (IC LC ’)
(i) (IC H’). Since H does not face reduced proﬁts due to domestic competition,
we can rewrite the constraint into .5R ≥ CP
f + cH(δ∗). In words, the total costs
of patenting and development need to stay below half of H’s expected cooperation
beneﬁt. This makes (IC H’) harder to fulﬁll than (IC H).
(ii) (IC LN’). We assumed in 3.1 that in the absence of domestic competition
ΠO
L(·,0) = 0. Then, the R.H.S. becomes −(CP
f + cL(δ∗)), which is always fulﬁlled.
(iii) (IC LC’). Note that the R.H.S. reads ΠC
L(δ∗,δ∗ +ε) since by overshooting, ﬁrm
L leads to an inference of H, which means that F will cooperate with L.N o t ea l s o
that (IC LC’) and (IC LC)a r et h es a m ec o n s t r a i n t sa n dc a nb er e - e x p r e s s e di n t o
R ≤ CP
f + cL(δ∗).20
Assumption. (i) Development costs cH(δ)a n dcL(δ) are linear. In this case we
restrict our attention to the situation in which cL − 2cH >C P










can be used to signal quality H.
(ii) Development costs cH(δ)a n dcL(δ)a r ec o n v e x ,cH(δ)−2cL(δ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nδ
and cL(1)−2cH(1) >C P
f . We deﬁne ¯ δ by cL(¯ δ)−2cH(¯ δ)=CP
f . Then, any δ∗ ∈
£¯ δ,1
¤
can serve as signal of type H.
Proposition 6 Under the given assumptions on belief structure and payoﬀ con-
ditions, the game has a continuum of separating PBE, in which H discloses ex-
actly the disclosure level δ∗, and L discloses 0, with δ∗ satisfying 2[CP
f + cH(δ∗)]
≤ R ≤ CP
f + cL(δ∗).
Equilibrium Reﬁnements. Applying the same domination based equilibrium
reﬁnements, we can narrow down the continuum of separating PBE to one unique
equilibrium in which the smallest equilibrium disclosure δ∗ is chosen. The exposition
follows very closely the one described in the previous case.
• Pooling equilibria: Existence.
We check whether under the given system of beliefs there exist active pooling equi-
libria. This is the case if the following IC conditions hold:
20Note again that lim
ε→0 (cL(δ













H(δ∗ + ε,δ∗)( I C H C P)
(i) Since ΠC
H(δ∗,δ∗)=R−(CP
f +cH(δ∗)), (IC H P) rewrites into .5R ≥ CP
f +cH(δ∗).
(ii) Similarly, we assume for ﬁrm L that ΠO
L(·,0) = 0. Then, (IC LoP) reads, analog
to (IC H P):.5R ≥ CP
f + cL(δ∗).
(iii) The third IC condition ensures that the H type would rather pool than outbid
L and win the contract with certainty. As in (i), the L.H.S rewrites into .5R −
(CP
f + cH(δ∗)), while the R.H.S. now reads R − (CP
f + cH(δ∗ + ε)). Since lim
ε→0
(cH(δ∗ + ε)) = cH(δ∗), (IC HCP) rewrites into .5R ≥ CP
f + cH(δ∗).
Proposition 7 The game has no pooling equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose there exists a δ that leads to pooling. In this case, both ﬁrms
win a cooperation with equal likelihood. Both ﬁrms receive .5R −CP
f − ck(δ),with
k  {L,H}.
Either type would be better oﬀ by moving from this given δ to δ+ε and getting the
contract with probability 1.
Case 2b: ν>. 5 The game also has equilibria under νΠH
F +(1−ν)ΠL
F ≥ ΠN
F .T h e
case ν>. 5p r o v i d e sﬁrm 1 with a natural advantage: F chooses ﬁrm 1 whenever
the two ﬁrms disclose the same amount. This leads to the general picture that ﬁrm
1 does not need anymore to outbid ﬁrm 2 to get the contract; matching becomes a
suﬃcient strategy to win the contract.
Recall Deﬁnition 4 on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Using the same beliefs, we can
now specify a particular δ∗ in this case to be deﬁned by R = CP
f +cL(δ∗). Then, for
any out-of-equilibrium disclosure pair, F’s beliefs can be written as follows:
(i) if max(δi,δj) <δ ∗, then µ1(δ1,δ2)=ν,
(i) if max(δi,δj) ≥ δ∗, then µi(δi,δj)=0i fδi <δ j, and µi(δ,δ)=ν.
16Proposition 8 This game has a semi-separating equilibrium in which ﬁrm 2 dis-
closes δ∗ in the event LH and F awards the contract to ﬁrm 2, and both ﬁrms disclose
0 in the event LH and F awards the contract to ﬁrm 1.
Proof. First, consider event LH.F i r m 1 ,o f t y p e L, would never disclose more
than δ∗21 since this would yield negative proﬁts for L even if it is awarded the
contract. Firm 2, the H-type discloses δ∗ + ε in order to win it. Therefore, ﬁrm 1
chooses to not disclose, while ﬁrm 2 discloses chooses δ∗ + ε in equilibrium.
Next, we consider event HL. Firm 2, now of type L, would never disclose more
than δ∗ since this would yield negative proﬁt s ,e v e nw h e nt h eﬁrm is awarded the
contract. Note that ﬁrm 2 can never win the contract as long as ﬁrm 1 can reach
the disclosure level δ∗and win the cooperation with certainty. Given the new belief
structure, ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to disclose either since it receives the contract
independent of the disclosure, thus it sets δ =0 . In equilibrium, neither ﬁrm discloses
and ﬁrm 1 is awarded the contract.
4 Subsidies
We have described three cases that characterize our extended setting. Case 1 as the
most realistic setting involves a situation in which ﬁrms have a strong incentive to
reveal. For obvious reasons, we need to exclude Case 2b from being of any interest
for the policymaker. We now characterize how generalized patent subsidies inﬂuence
the decisions on disclosure.
Assumption Government is not informed about the domestic ﬁrms’ type. It oﬀers
patent subsidies of S = CP
f to both ﬁrms. This is known to the ﬁrms at their
decision stage.
Proposition 9 (Separating PBE, Case 1, 2a):
Subsidies do not change the outcome of separating equilibria. Since there is no reason
to assume that either domestic ﬁrm will keep its level of disclosure δ∗ constant under
subsidies, subsidies lead to wasteful competition in that both ﬁrms could now increase
their level of disclosure. This, per unit of increase, is less costly for ﬁrm H. H will
now disclose a higher level δ∗, depending on the additional level of disclosure that
ﬁrm L can gain by receiving S = CP
f . L will not disclose and the ﬁrms again separate.
Subsidizing has no eﬀect on the outcome and is wasteful. Total welfare is decreased.
Proof. Recall that the optimum disclosure level at which the ﬁrms separate was
found at R = CP
f +cL(δ∗). Subsidies covering S = CP
f lead to separation under R =
cL(δ∗∗), with cL(δ∗∗) >c L(δ∗)a n dδ∗∗ >δ .
21Note that the incentive structure follows case 1. Thus, δ





This paper has aimed at shedding some light on the following two questions. Why is
it that some ﬁrms disclose information through international patenting, while others
in the same country don’t? Can patent subsidies induce ﬁrms to disclose, and are
they an eﬃcient policy instrument?
Our main result shows that under realistic assumptions ﬁrms disclose if their inven-
tion is of suﬃcient quality for the foreign ﬁrm, compared to the level of competencies
that can be reached by the domestic competitor. Our ﬁndings link the decision to
patent of ﬁrms to their knowledge of their speciﬁc situation, given their knowledge
on the presence of domestic innovators. Firms use the patent system to reveal their
knowledge. Keeping in mind that ﬁrms are usually better informed about their
speciﬁc technological competencies and the usefulness of their inventions for speciﬁc
applications than policymakers, this particular implication of the model is indeed of
some value.
Second, we have set up diﬀerent scenarios, following diﬀerent proﬁt expectations
of the foreign ﬁr m . I naw o r l di nw h i c hc o o p e r a t i o np r o ﬁts would not beat non-
cooperation in expectation, only disclosure can lead one of the domestic ﬁrms to
cooperation, while in a relaxed setting, the priors that the foreign ﬁrm may hold,
may ease the situation of the ﬁrm under consideration. Our general result is that
the two ﬁrms separate according to their competencies and that pooling equilibria
do not exist.
Third, our result shows no indication for patent subsidies that would cover the
ﬁxed costs of patenting. Even in the most realistic case 1, patent subsidies can-
not help ﬁrm L to increase its chances to win a partnership. In all cases, patent
subsidies are wasteful. This, at least, should suggests to policymakers to rethink
commonly used instruments that aim at correcting existing patent systems toward
their particular needs. A patent system, even if ﬂawed in its design, still has its
value as a mechanism to reveal information.
While capturing all possible relevant payoﬀ cases, the richness of the model
leaves space for extensions and for future research. Our results are rather robust;
our main focus was on the incentives that govern international patenting decisions
of ﬁrms that already hold a national patent and decide on whether or not engage in
incremental development in order to patent internationally. We found this setting
plausible, given the empirical observation that we took as our starting point. The
model developed in section three captures a far broader scenario. In order to keep
our setting simple and tractable, we refrained from adding further modeling options,
such as the inﬂuence of R&D partnerships on domestic competition. Future research
may be worthwhile to capture an extended setting.
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